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Abstract
Even when labour mobility is low, international integration affects
labour markets by making jobs more mobile. This runs via product
market integration, which is an essential element of European
integration. Increasing job mobility aects the possibilities single
countries perceive in pursuing employment policies. In a setting
where trade is driven by comparative advantages, and thus wage
competitiveness plays an important role for employment, it is
shown that there is a tendency that a bias arises in employment
policies. Policies expanding private employment tend to be used
too little, while policies harming private employment tend to be
used too much. These effects are stronger the more integrated
product markets are.
JEL Classification: F1, F42, J23, J3.







It is an increasing policy concern that international integration may be harmful
for employment objectives, and that it will make it increasingly diﬃcult to
implement employment oriented policies. There is a vivid public debate on these
issues, and public reactions at international summits have in a very visible way
re￿ected the concern for employment and social objectives in the international
integration process. Since this is shaping views on the pros and cons of further
integration it is worth considering these issues in more detail, both to evaluate
the strength of the argument, and to consider possible remedies to the extent
that these views have some support.
The importance at the policy level are already visible. There has been a
growing presure for the EU to take a more clear responsibility with respect to
employment, and this has resulted in an explicit employment objective. Article
2 of the Amsterdam treaty (June 1997) reads
￿Member States ... shall regard promoting employment as a matter of com-
mon concern and shall co-ordinate their action￿.
In an interpretation of the treaty the EU commission writes1:
￿Embedded throughout the approach set out in the Treaty is a recognition
of the interdependence of employment policies pursued in Member States, and
the need for coordination to ensure that measures to support employment in
one Member state do not negatively aﬀect progress in others. The notition of
employment as a matter of common concern stresses that member states, in
pursuing their own employment policies, should be contributing to a ￿positive
sum game￿ across the union.￿
These statements recognize that there are interdependencies in employ-
ment across European countries, that they are growing growing, and that non-
cooperative policy making may lead to policies which are not bene￿cial for the
overall employment level. Surprisingly, these issues have not been much re-
searched in the academic literature. The present paper takes a ￿rst step in
trying to address whether the concern raised above is justi￿ed, and in particu-
lar the extent to which there is a bias in non-cooperative policy making which
has potential harmful eﬀects for the overall employment level within the EU.
The present paper takes its outset in certain stylized facts concerning inte-
gration in Europe (see e.g. Coppel and Durand (1999), Andersen et. al. (2000),
and Middelfart-Knarvik et. al. (2000)). There is a strong increase in trade,
but it is as concentrated in other European countries as it has been in the past,
intra-industrial trade is growing rapidly, there is a tendency towards increasing
specialization among European countries, but labour remains fairly immobile
across European countries. In short the primary driving force in European
integration is product market integration.
Sometimes substantial labour market eﬀects of European integration are
dismissed on account of the fact that labour mobility among European countries
1See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/empl&esf/amst_en.htm
2currently is very modest2. This conclusion may, however, be premature. A basic
lesson of trade theory is that mobility of goods may be a substitute for mobility
of factors of production. European integration of in particular product markets
may therefore have important eﬀects for labour markets. To put it simple,
integration of product markets eﬀectively implies that jobs become more mobile,
since the more competitive areas will tend to have job creation at the cost of
less competitive areas (via changes in market shares, FDI￿s or ￿rm relocation
across countries). Hence, even though labour mobility is small and not likely to
increase much in the near future, it is a fact that job mobility is increasing as
a consequence of European integration. In policy debates there is an increasing
focus on this mobility of jobs, which recently has been exempli￿ed by some large
cooperations shifting the location of their production from one EU country
to another (see e.g. Andersen, Haldrup and Słrensen, 2000). The increased
mobility of jobs may have important eﬀects on labour markets and therefore in
turn employment oriented policies. Single countries may perceive that ambitious
employment oriented policies may lead to loss of competitivenes and a net export
of jobs, and therefore employment oriented policies may be downward biased.
The present paper considers the implications of product market integration
for a very stylized form of employment policy, namely, public employment. This
is motivated both by the empirical observation that this is one of the most often
proposed instruments in active employment policy, and the fact that it can be
modelled in a straightforward way. It is conjectured that the basic qualitative
lessons can be generalized to other forms of instruments in employment policy.
The issue of interdependencies in employment and social policies has a long
history in economic theory. According to simple Keynesian reasoning there
would be a tendency that countries choose insuﬃciently expansionary ￿scal
policies since the demand leakage reduces the expansionary domestic eﬀects of
￿scal policies (see Cooper (1985)). This line of reasoning has often motivated
proposals for coordinated ￿scal expansions intended to overcome free rider prob-
lems in policies oriented towards output and employment. This view has been
contested on two accounts, namely, the usual problems associated with the the-
oretical foundation of Keynesian models and the fact that policy evaluations are
not based on an explicit welfare analysis but instead rely on arbitrary policy
objective function.
A number of authors have considered international interdependencies in ￿s-
cal policy in explicitly formulated general equilibrium models, and have ad-
dressed the issue of cooperative vs non-cooperative policy making from an ex-
plicit welfare approach. The standard set-up has featured specialized produc-
tion, that is, countries specialize in production of speci￿c commodities which
they trade with each other. One surprising ￿nding in these models is that ￿scal
policies tend to be too expansionary when comparing the non-coopertive to the
cooperative policy outcome (see e.g. Chari and Kehoe (1990), Devereux (1991),
Turnovsky (1988) and van der Ploeg (1987,1988). The reason is a term-of-trade
2This may, of course, change in the future because international integration reduces both
the direct and the indirect (cultural, language etc.) costs of mobility.
3or ￿beggar thy neighboor￿ eﬀect. Fiscal policy in the form of demand for do-
mestically produced goods tends to shift demand from foreign to domestic prod-
ucts, which in turn improve the terms of trade and thus the real income of the
home country. No such terms of trade eﬀect arises in the cooperative case, and
therefore non-cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary3. The presence
of ineﬃciently low employment levels does not overturn this result (Andersen
and Słrensen (1995), Andersen, Rasmussen and Słrensen (1996)). Likewise the
terms-of-trade eﬀect implies that the optimal setting of tax rates should aim
at twisting demand towards domestically produced goods (See Holmlund and
Kolm (1999), Lockwood (2000)).
T h et e r m so ft r a d ee ﬀect is debatable since it essentially implies that the
￿scal authorities exploit the market power the domestic economy has relative
to its trading partners by being the sole producer of a particular set of com-
modities. It is an open question whether this structure matches the current Eu-
ropean situation adequately. Basically the specialized production model relies
on exogenously given characteristics which explains the structure of specialized
commodities. However, the European situation seems to match this assumption
to a decreasing degree. An increasing share of trade and thus production is
in commodities which in principle can be produced anywhere in Europe (intra-
industrial trade) - the domestic production can thus for an increasing share of
commodities be replaced by foreign production (see e.g. Coppel and Durand
(1999)). These may not be perfect substitutes but there is a high degree of
￿exibility - up to ￿protection￿ caused by trade frictions and diﬀerences in costs
etc.- and these have important implications for the interdependencies in policies
across countries.
The present paper presents a model capturing some of these aspects. The
location of production is ￿exible up to diﬀerences caused by comparative ad-
vantages and trade frictions. Trade frictions in￿uence whether commodities are
tradeables or non-tradeables in equilibrium, while comparative advantages de-
termine whether tradeables are exportables or importables. Domestic policies
in￿uence both margins, and a concern is the extent to which domestic policies
directed towards employment objectives have harmful eﬀects on competitiveness
and therefore in turn employment and income creation in the private sector. If
so, it may imply that policy makers adopt a ￿downward￿ bias in employment
oriented policies.
The paper runs as follows: Section 2 sets up the details of the two-country
model, and section 3 considers the mechanisms determining employment. Next
section 4 considers employment policies and the diﬀerences between non-cooperative
and cooperative employment oriented policies, and how these are aﬀected by fur-
ther international integration. Section 5 draws some implications of the analysis
for employment policies in the EU.
3Irrespective of whether the policy in abolsute terms is expansionary or contractionary.
42 The Model4
Consider two countries which are fairly similar. The produce and trade in
commodities of which there is a continuum indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each good
can in principle be produced either at home or abroad, and can be imported
or exported across countries. Denote the price charged for commodity i by
domestic producers in the domestic market by Pi and the price charge by foreign
producers in the foreign market P∗
i (the exchange rate is assumed constant, and
normalized to one without loss of generality). Trade involves various frictions in
the form of explicit and implicit trade costs. Trading one unit of a commodity
internationally absorbs κ units of the good in frictions (Samuelson￿s iceberg
costs), that is, if a foreign commodity is imported it costs (1 + κ)P∗
i in the
domestic market, similarly, if a domestic ￿rm exports a commodity it obtains
a net-price (1 + κ)
−1 P∗
i . Trade frictions are symmetric with respect to the
direction of trade. International integration can now easily be captured by a
reduction in κ.
Production
Assume that domestic production of a given good takes place in a representative
￿rm possessing a production technique
Yi = AiLi
where Ai denotes an exogenous productivity parameter, and Li is the labour
input in the production function.
Firms are competitive (with free entry) and the output price of domestically
produced goods of type i is accordingly linked to the wage (W) as5
Pi = A−1
i W
As a consequence ￿rm relocation between countries becomes a non-issue, and
the analysis therefore focuses on the employment implications of trade ￿ows.
It follows straightforwardly that the commodity i will be imported if foreign
producers can supply at a price which is competitive in the domestic market
(i ∈ I), i.e.
Pi > (1 + κ)P∗
i
4The model structure builds on Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977). See also Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ (1996) for a textbook version of the model. The same framework is used in
Andersen (2001) to analyse how product market integration may cause increased heterogeneity
in the labour market.
5Allowing for imperfectly competitive product markets will not change the analysis quali-
tatively, provided that product market power is symmetric across the two countries.
5a n de x p o r t e di fd o m e s t i c￿rms are competitive in the foreign market (i ∈ E),
i.e.
Pi < (1 + κ)
−1 P∗
i




i ≤ Pi ≤ (1 + κ)P∗
i
Although there may be price diﬀerences between the domestic and the foreign
market there is no trade, since the trade friction is too large to make it worth-
while.
Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1]. Households de-
rive utility from consumption of commodities and leisure as well as public ser-
vices/goods. The utility function is assumed to be separable and reads
U(ch) − D(lh)+V (g) ,U 0 > 0,U00 < 0,D 0 > 0,D 00 > 0,V0 > 0,V00 > 0,
where the ￿rst term gives the uility derived from private consumption (ch), the
second term the disutility from work (lh)a n dt h e￿nal term is the utility derived
from publicly provided goods and services (g). The private consumption bundle














, θ > 1,
where chi is the consumption of commodity i by household h,a n dt h ed function
gives the disutility of labour.








where (1−τ)rh denotes the real disposable income of the household and where
































with W denoting the nominal wage and l total employment (= sum of private
(e) and public (g) employment, see below).
The private consumption bundle for household6 h can be written
ch =( 1 − τ)rh − d(lh)




Finally, using that all agents are identical it follows that adopting a utilitarian




l) − D(l)+V (g)
Government
The government demands labour to produce public goods/services. This cap-
tures that for most countries employment constitutes the major part of public
consumption7. Denote public demand for labour by g, and assume for simplicity
a linear technlogy linking inputs and outputs in the public sector. The utility of
the goods/services produced is denoted V (g), cf the household utility function.
The budget balance of the public sector reads
W
P
g = τr (1)
Note that it is assumed that the wage rate for public employees corresponds
to that of private employees.
6Notice that there is no pro￿t income due to the assumption of constant returns to labour
and free entry of ￿rms.
7For most countries wages and salaries are the dominant expenditure item, see e.g. IMF
(2001).
7Using the public sector budget constraint (1) it follows that private dispos-
able income can be written








Public employment therefore does not have any income eﬀe c t s ,w h i c hi nt u r n
implies that variations in public activity or employment do not have any Key-
nesian aggregate demand eﬀects8. The model is classical in structure, and any
eﬀects of variations in public employment arises from the way in which it aﬀects
relative prices (real wages) (see below).
8Note that this also holds even if the wages paid in the public sector are only a fraction of
t h ew a g e sp a i di nt h ep u b l i cs e c t o r .
8Wage Setting
The wage setting relation is speci￿ed in a general way encompassing various
wage setting institutions to show that the results do not depend on a particular
wage setting institution. There are two channels through which wage setting in
general will be aﬀected, namely, the aggregate employment level (l = e+g), and
the tax rate (τ). Since the latter depends on the level of public employment (g)
it follows that the real wage target can be written as
W
P
= λ(e,g) , λe > 0,λg S 0
An increase in private employment may lead to an increase in the real wage
rate, because the labour market becomes more tight. An increase in public
employment may either increase or decrease wages depending on incentives in
wage formation. Appendix A develops in detail the wage setting relation in the
standard case of a monopoly union operating under a right to manage structure.
If the labour market is characterized by imperfections inducing an ineﬃ-





that is, the marginal utility value of real wage exceeds the marginal disutility of
work re￿ecting that the market is not achieving the eﬃcient level of employment.
T h es o u r c eo ft h i si n e ﬃciency is both the taxation and the market power of wage
setters (see Appendix A). For the latter it is well-known that the source of this
ineﬃciency may arise either on the demand side (￿rms) or on the supply side
(employees, unions) with the same qualitative implications for the aggregate
employment level. With the set-up adopted here the ineﬃciency originates on
the supply side of the labour market.
Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium condition for non-tradeables reads
Ci = Yi if i ∈ NT
and for exportables the condition is
Ci +( 1+κ)C∗
i = Yi if i ∈ E
Similar conditions hold for the foreign country, and since an importable
for the domestic country is an exportable for the foreign country this fully
characterizes the equilibrium for product markets (similar expressions apply
for the foreign country). Notice that employment is demand determined in
equilibrium given as the sum of private (e) and public (g) employment, i.e.
l = e + g, and that trade is always balanced (static model).
93 Equilibrium employment
Consider ￿rst the determination of the equilibrium level of employment, and
therefore the general equilibrium to the two-country model. It is assumed that
two countries are completely symmetric (for productivity this applies to the
distribution of productivity, cf below) and that they both have the structure
outlined above. All foreign variables are denoted by a *.
De￿ne the relative productivity of domestic ￿rms relative to foreign ￿rms in





Productivity is distributed identically in the two countries, and the sectors are
indexed in such a way that ai is increasing in i, that is, for low values of i the
foreign country has a comparative advantage, and for high values of i the home
country has a comparative advantage9. The comparative advantage variable
ai is symmetrically distributed over the interval [λ
−1,λ],λ < 1.10 This implies
that ai =1for i = 1/2, that is, for half the sectors the domestic economy
has a comparative advantage relative to the foreign country and vice versa.
This assumption on productivity ensures that there is trade in equilibrium, and
the productivity diﬀerences can be interpreted as capturing many of the eﬀects
associated with the new trade theory (see e.g. Krugman (1995)). Note that it
is an implication that the average skill levels are the same in the two countries,
and similar trade frictions in all sectors rule out that some low productivity
sectors can be protected by high trade frictions so as to maintain a status as
non-tradeables.




Since labour is assumed to be the only (variable) input, it follows that relative
wages solely determine international competitiveness.
Trade and domestic activity
A key question is which commodities are traded in equilibrium, and which fac-
tors determine the direction of trade for each type of commodity. It follows
9The index is thus not necessarily in any way related to the characteristics of the com-
modities, that is, two commodities which have fairly similar characteristics (say French and
German cars) can be located quite diﬀerently on the unit interval, since one country has
a comparative advantage in the production of the one type, and the other country has a
comparative advantage in the production of the other type.
10Assume that Ai is uniformly distributed over the inverval [1 − x,1+x] and similarly for
A∗










, with a density function with the
property that f( 1
z)=f(z).









(1 + κ)−1 <
ω
ai
< (1 + κ)
The commodity is an exportable (i ∈ E) for the home country if
(1 + κ)−1 <
ω
ai




De￿ne the critical import level for comparative advantage as
aI ≡ ω(1 + κ)−1
and the critical export level for comparative advantage as
aE ≡ ω(1 + κ)
It follows that exportable sectors are given by
E ≡ {ai | ai >a E}
the non-tradeable sectors by
NT ≡ {ai | aI ≤ ai ≤ aE}
and the importable sectors by
I ≡ {ai | ai <a I}
Exports take place for activities for which the domestic economy holds a suﬃ-
ciently strong comparative advantage, while oppositely imports take place where
the comparative advantage of the foreign country is suﬃciently strong. The
non-tradeable sectors are made up of activities with intermediary levels of com-
parative advantages (seen relative to trade frictions).
Obviously, if a commodity i is an importable in the home country it is an
exportable in the foreign country (i ∈ I ⇒ i ∈ E∗), and vice versa. It is
important to note that the sectoral structure is determined endogenously in the
model.








11The higher the relative wage, the higher the comparative advantage needs to be
both protected from imports, and to be able to export. An increase in the rela-
tive wage will thus increase the importable sector and decrease the exportable
sector. The net eﬀect is tantamount to a net export of jobs.
T h ei m p o r t a n tt h i n gt on o t eh e r ei st h a tr e l a t i v ew a g e s-o rw a g ec o m -
petitiveness - play a crucial role, the higher the domestic wage relative to the
f o r e i g n( t h ew o r s et h ew a g ec o m p e t i t i v e n e s s )t h em o r ej o b se ﬀectively relocate
to foreign companies - other things being equal.
The non-tradeable sector arises because diﬀerences in comparative advantage
for some commodities are too small for trade to be worthwhile given the trade
frictions. The lower the trade frictions, the smaller the non-tradeable sector








Private employment (e) can be written as a function of foreign employment
(e∗), the level of public employment at home (g) and the level of foreign public
employment (g∗), i.e.
e = π(e∗,g,g∗) , 0 < πe∗ < 1,πg ≷ 0,πg∗ ≷ 0 (2)
a similar expression holds for foreign employment.
An increase in foreign employment has always a positive eﬀect on domestic
employment. The reason is both that higher foreign employment increases for-
eign income and thus export demand, and that the induced increase in foreign
wages cause a change in competitiveness leading to an expansion of the num-
ber of goods which can be exported and a reduction in the number of goods
which are imported. This mechanism captures an international employment
multiplier.
The sensitivity of private employment to public employment depends on the
wage response, and we have (see Appendix B)
sign πg = −sign λg
and
sign πg = −sign πg∗
That is, the impact eﬀect on private employment of an increase in public employ-
ment is postive if wages decrease (λg < 0 ) since this makes private production
more pro￿table (a vice versa if wages increase λg > 0). The domestic and for-
eign impact responses are always opposite in sign, if the policy change bene￿ts
domestic employment it harms foreign employment on impact, and vice versa.
12Taking into account how domestic and foreign employment are interdepen-
dent we have that the eﬀect of a change in public employment on private em-





1 − (πe∗)2[πg + πe∗πg∗] (3)




1 − (πe∗)2[πg∗ + πe∗πg] (4)








The ￿rst part of the equality says that if a change in public employment has an
expansionary eﬀect on domestic employment it also has an expansionary eﬀect
on foreign employment, and vice versa. This captures the important spill-over
eﬀect arising from trade. While the impact eﬀe c t sa r eo p p o s i t ei ns i g n ,t h et o t a l
eﬀect is equal in sign due to the fact that the employment multiplier is always
strong enough to overcome diﬀerences in impact eﬀects11.
The second part of the expression gives the condition under which a change in
public employment expands or contracts private employment. An expansionary
eﬀect arises if an increase in public employment moderates wage demands (λg <
0), while a contractionary eﬀect arises in the opposite case (λg > 0). This re￿ects
the classical properties of the model, and is thus a property shared with closed
economy models. It is well-known that the simplest way to ensure that public
activities are expansionary is to adopt the so-called ￿Classical￿ approach in the
sense of assuming that income eﬀects dominate substitution eﬀects in labour
supply (see Dixon and Rankin, Baxter and King 1992). Appendix A elaborates
on the details.
Gains from lower trade frictions
As a prelude to the subsequent discussion of employment policies it is useful
to point out that there are welfare gains from international integration. Lower
frictions (κ)imply that less resources are absorbed by trade frictions and an
increase in the gain from further division of labour or exploitation of the scope
for specialization given by diﬀerences in comparative advantages. A reduction




11The reason is that a change in employment always has both a direct eﬀect (income changes
for given wages) and an indirect eﬀect (the wage change), while the change in public employ-
ment only on impact released the indirect eﬀect.




Aggregate welfare is improved both due to the consumption gain arising from
lower trade frictions and the fact that employment is increasing (employment is




Finally, note that lower trade frictions lead to more trade, that is, the non-
tradeable sector shrinks and both the importable and the exportable sector
increases. The metric for international integration used in the present analysis
is thus consistent with the trend increase in international trade which has been
observed over the recent decades.
Lower trade frictions also change the spill-over eﬀects between the two coun-




∂ | πg |
∂κ
> 0 ,
∂ | πg∗ |
∂κ
< 0
that is, the lower the trade friction the higher the ￿international employment
multiplier￿ and the less does a change in domestic public employment aﬀect do-
mestic private employment numerically, and the more it aﬀects foreign employ-
ment numerically. The lower the trade friction the stronger the ￿employment￿













The smaller the trade friction the less variations in domestic public employment
aﬀect domestic private employment, and the more they aﬀect foreign private
employment. To put it diﬀerently, lower trade frictions imply that expansionary
employment policies boost domestic employment less, and foreign employment
more, the less the trade friction (and vice versa). The spill-over eﬀects thus
become stronger the smaller the trade frictions. This can also be interpreted
as capturing the fact that with further integration the control of the domestic
policy maker over the domestic economy becomes smaller, and the in￿uence of
foreign policies becomes larger.
12It follows that
∂(r−d(l))
∂κ > 0 if ∂r
∂κ >d l
∂l
∂κ which is the case since wages exceed the
competitive wage.
144 Employment policies
Consider next the determination of public employment. The policy decision is
assumed to rely on a utilitarian criterian maximizing the utility of the represen-
tative household. Both the case of non-cooperative and cooperative policy mak-
ing are considered to assess the importance of the interdependencies in policies
between the two countries, and how they are aﬀected by further international
integration.
The optimal policy (g) thus maximizes
U(λ(e,g)e) − D(e + g)+V (g)
subject to employment being determined by (2). The non-cooperative solution
is found by taking foreign public employment (g∗) for given, and the cooperative
solution is found by assuming g = g∗.
The optimal level of public employment is determined by the condition




The ￿rst term on the LHS captures the direct resource consequences (expanding
public employment means more work, thus a loss of leisure) of an increase in
public employment13, and the second term is the indirect eﬀect arising from
the eﬀect a change in public employment has on private employment (the dis-
tortion). Notice that Uc(λee + λ) − Dl > 0 due to imperfect competition in
the labour market, and thus implies that employment is ineﬃciently low. If
an increase in public employment increases private employment it implies that
the marginal costs of public activities are lowered, and vice versa. A diﬀerence
between the non-cooperative and the cooperative case may arise because these
costs are perceived diﬀerently in the two cases.
4.1 Interdependencies in employment policies
For both the non-cooperative and cooperative case the optimal level of public
employment is determined by (5), but the diﬀerence between the two arises
because the perceived eﬀect of a change in public employment on private em-
ployment ( ∂e
∂g)d i ﬀers between the two cases. In the cooperative case eventual
interdependencies or externalities in employment policies between the two coun-
tries are taken into account. To compare the two cases note ￿rst that a change
in public employment in the non-cooperative case is perceived to aﬀect private








13Note that Dl −Ucλge>0 is assumed, that is, the utility loss from more work is assumed
never to be dominated by the indirect wage eﬀect, see appendix A.
15This diﬀerence can be interpreted in terms of a demand and a cost spill-over
eﬀect. Single countries do not take into account that a change in domestic
public employment will change domestic income and thus the demand for foreign
product (demand spill-over), whereas they perceive that wage competitiveness
will be aﬀected (cost spillover). In the cooperative case the demand spill-over
eﬀect is taken into account while there is no cost spill-over eﬀect to take into
account (wage competitiveness is always unity).
Accordingly, if an increase in public employment has an expansionary eﬀect





Non-cooperative policy making implies that policies which can boost employ-
ment are at an ineﬃciently low level. Non-cooperative policy making does not
take into account that the policy bene￿ts employment for the trade partners,
but fears that competitiveness is detoriated. More could be done to improve
employment if countries coordinated their policies.





If public employment has a contractionary eﬀect on employment they are at
an ineﬃciently high level. Non-cooperative policy making does not take into
account that the policy is harming employment for its trade partners, and they
perceive that competitiveness can be improved by use of this policy instrument.
In sum, non-cooperative policy making implies that policies which can im-
prove employment are used too little while policies which are harmful for pri-
v a t ee m p l o y m e n ta r eu s e dt o om u c h . I ti sa ni m p l i c a t i o nt h a ti nc o m p a r i n g
the employment level in the non-cooperative and the cooperative case we have
unambiguously that
e |coop>e|non−coop (8)
There are two mechanisms generating this result. Non-cooperative policy
making disregards the demand spill-over and over-estimates the cost spill-over.
Making a comparison in terms of total employment is more diﬃcult. If the





which follows directly from (6) and (8). Whereas for the contractionary case we
have




16This is important since it brings out that non-cooperative policy making unam-
biguously causes private employment to be too low (8), but the implications for
the aggregate employment level may be ambiguous.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h et e r m so ft r a d ee ﬀect which has been
in focus in much of the literature on ￿scal interdependencies, cf introduction, is
ruled out here by the pricing assumption made, that is, the mark-up pricing rules
out that the relative price of domestically produced commodities can increase
as a result of an expansionary policy - there is no terms of trade eﬀect, but a
demand and a wage/pro￿tability eﬀect.
4.2 International integration
Would further international integration aﬀect the interdependencies in policies,
and if so in what direction? Is there reason to be more or less concerned about
these externalities in the face of further integration than in the past with less
integration? Further integration is in the present context con￿ned to product
market integration in the form of reduced trade friction (a decrease in κ).
To see the eﬀects involved it is convenient ￿rst to solve for the symmetric
cooperative equilibrium since it is the simplest. The optimal level of public em-
ployment is determined by the condition (5) where the LHS gives the marginal
costs as the sum of the direct utility cost of more work and the cost of reducing
private employment (the crowding out eﬀect). International integration may
aﬀect the optimal level of public employment by aﬀecting the marginal costs.
The eﬀects of international integration on the optimal level of public em-




Two eﬀects are at stake. First, a reduction in the trade friction implies - other
things being equal - an increase in the private consumption bundle. This im-
plies a reduction in the marginal utility of the private consumption bundle,
and therefore the marginal costs of expanding public employment goes down.
Obtaining an increase in the private consumption bundle implies that part of
this is used to expand public services/goods and therefore employment. Sec-
ond lower trade frictions imply an increase in private employment, therefore
the ineﬃciency in the overall employment level is reduced, and this reduces the
employment motive as a reason for expanding public employment.
Although the level eﬀect is ambiguous it is the case that the diﬀerence be-
tween the cooperative and non-cooperative level of public employment is in-
creasing when the trade friction is reduced. In appendix C it is shown that
∂ | g |coop −g |non−coop|
∂κ
< 0













The lower the trade friction, the larger are the spill-over eﬀects and therefore the
larger (numerically) the diﬀerence between the eﬀect on employment of changes
in public employment perceived in the non-cooperative case compared to the
cooperative case. Intuitively, the larger the spill-over eﬀects, the larger the dif-
ference between the cooperative and non-cooperative case, since this diﬀerence
is driven by the spill-over eﬀects.
5 European integration and employment poli-
cies
This paper has considered these issues in a setting with further integration be-
tween fairly similar countries between whom trade is not driven by diﬀerences in
factor endowments but by diﬀerences in comparative advantages. It was shown
that due to a concern for competitiveness and a neglect of demand spill-overs
there is a tendency that employment policies have a downward bias seen relative
to private employment. These ￿ndings capture concerns often underlying pol-
icy debates but running oppositely to the traditional ￿ndings in the theoretical
literature. Moreover, this interdependency is stronger the more integrated the
markets are, pointing to the increasing importance of this issue as European
economies are getting increasingly integrated.
The European integration process has led to a debate on the role of em-
ployment and social policies within the EU, and there is a growing political
pressure for these issues to be given a more explicit role in EU policies. Explicit
employment objectives have been introduced in the Amsterdam treaty, cf the
introduction. The process concerning labour markets is known as the Luxem-
bourg process (initiated prior to the Amsterdam treaty). Annual reports on the
employment situation in all EU countries are issued each year, and they include
recommendations on policy initiatives to be taken. Social issues are the topic
of the Social Pagt from 1999. Certain issues like working conditions, noti￿ca-
tion rules, European work councils and equal treatment rules can be decided by
majority within the EU, whereas unanimity is needed on issues related to social
security and ￿ring rules.
Are these steps justi￿ed on economic terms or do they only re￿ect a political
concern attempting to give the EU a social pro￿le? Surprisingly, an issue which
has not been much debated in the academic literature.14 Most of the debate has
focused on a race to the bottom induced by mobility of workers - the empirical
14There is a larger literature addressing whether trade liberalizations should be accompa-
nied with requirements concerning labour standards, an issue particularly relevant for the
￿Globalization￿-debate on the consequences of further integration between developing and in-
dustrialized countries. See Lee (1997) for a survey of this issue and references to the literature.
18importance of which is often contested. The present paper has shown that even
without such mobility there are interdependencies in economic policies and ￿scal
policies in particular, and that a concern for competitiveness and a neglect of the
demand spill-over eﬀect does produce a downward bias in employment policies.
Are employment targets an appropriate response to this challenge? First,
t h e r ei sa ni s s u eo nh o wt od e ￿ne operational targets for employment (num-
ber of unemployed, the unemployment rate (if so de￿ned how?)) etc. Second,
whether such targets are conducive depends on the labour market structure. If
employment is low due to structural problems in the labour market, an employ-
ment target may be harmful by redirecting policies from coping with structural
policies, to indirect measures like public employment programmes. Thirdly, even
if structural problems cannot be remidied, employment targets are still prob-
lematic since they very imprecisely target the ineﬃciencies in non-cooperative
policy making. A problem which is reinforced when taking into account struc-
tural diﬀerences across countries as well as shocks and dynamics.
It must thus be concluded that current policies do not adequately address the
interdependencies in employment policies among EU countries. An interesting
topic for future research would be to make a quantitative assessment of the
importance of the mechanisms addressed in this paper.
Appendix A: Wage setting




e) − D(e + g)
Maximizing this with respect to the real wage taking into account that private
employment depends on the wage rate and given the tax rate (public employ-









(1 + ε)] − εDl(e + g)
‚
=0
where ε < −1 denotes the elasticity of labour demand wrt to the real wage rate.





i.e. employment is ineﬃciently low both due to the taxation (τ) and the market
power ( ε
1+ε > 1).
The second order condition is that
F W
P < 0
Using that the public sector budget constraint can be written



































































unless the budget eﬀect is very strong (higher employment lowers the tax rate
so much that this dominates over the direct eﬀect). This is ruled out and hence
∂ W
P






∂g ≷ 0.N o t et h a t













)(1 + ε) − 2εDll
‚
> 0
The wage relation can now be summarized as
W
P
= λ(e,g) , λe > 0,λg ≷ 0
A p p e n d i xB :E m p l o y m e n t
De￿ne ω ≡ W
W ∗ =
λ(e,g)
λ(e∗,g∗) and ai ≡ Ai
A∗
i . It follows that sector i produces an
exportable if ai >a E ≡ ω(1+κ), while there is no production in the sector and
the commodities are imported if ai <a I ≡ ω(1 + κ)−1.
Equilibrium private employment can now be written as the sum of employ-
ment in the production of non-tradeables, the employment needed to serve the
domestic market for the exportable, and the employment needed to serve the







































































i λ(e,g)ρ(ω)(1 + κ)
¢−θ
λ(e∗,g∗)e∗h(ai)dai























































≡ ρ(ω) , ρ0(ω) > 0



























21In more compact form (9) can be written





















































































(λ(e∗,g∗))2 + ρ(ω)−θ λg∗e∗
λ(e,g)e
22Note that in symmetric equilibrium we have
Ψe∗ = −Ψe ; Ψg∗ = −Ψg.
Γie = −Γie∗ ; Γig = −Γig∗ i =1 ,2
Employment can be summarized by the implicit functions
e = π(e∗,g,g∗,κ)
e∗ = π(e,g∗,g,κ)
Note that evaluated in a symmetric equilibrium we have
∂e
∂e∗ = πe∗ = −
λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψe∗ + Γ1e∗ + ΨΓ2e∗]
(1 − θ)λ
−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ




≡ πg = −
(1 − θ)λ
−θλg [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψg + Γ1g + ΨΓ2g]
(1 − θ)λ
−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψe + Γ1e + ΨΓ2e]
≷ 0
∂e
∂g∗ ≡ πg∗ = −
λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψg∗ + Γ1g∗ + ΨΓ2g∗]
(1 − θ)λ
−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψe + Γ1e + ΨΓ2e]
≷ 0
It is easily seen that sign (πg)=- s i g nλg and sign (πg∗)=s i g nλg, and hence
sign (πg)=-sign(πg∗), and that | πe |< 1.Note also that (the employment eﬀect
always dominates in the country interdependency)
p πeπg p>p πg∗ p














∂g∗ = sign(πg∗ + πe∗πg)
= signπg




−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψe + Γ1e + ΨΓ2e]
i2
= −λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψg∗ + Γ1g∗ + ΨΓ2g∗]
h
(1− θ)λ
−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ





1−θ[Γ2Ψe∗ + Γ1e∗ + ΨΓ2e∗]
ih
(1 − θ)λ
−θλg [Γ1 + ΨΓ2]+λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψg + Γ1g + ΨΓ2g]
i
= −λ
1−θ [Γ1 + ΨΓ2](1− θ)λ
−θ [λe[Γ2Ψg∗ + Γ1g∗ + ΨΓ2g∗] − λg[Γ2Ψe∗ + Γ1e∗ + ΨΓ2e∗]]
Since











1 − (πe∗)2[πg + πe∗πg∗]












|coop forλg ≷ 0
if
1




A =( 1− θ)λ
−θλe [Γ1 + ΨΓ2] < 0
B = λ
1−θ[Γ2Ψe + Γ1e + ΨΓ2e] < 0
C = λ























By substution is can be veri￿ed that
1











(I) Proof that 1
1−(πe∗)2[πg + πe∗πg∗] < −
λg






















which is ful￿lled since B/C>
λg
λe
(I) Proof that 1
1−(πe∗)2[πg + πe∗πg∗] > −
λg
λe for λg > 0 (implying C<0)
















































b C ≡ C
λe
λg
and b C>B . From the de￿nition of C and B we have that





















(1 + κ)θ−1 (A +2 B)









































































The condition determining optimal public employment reads
Γg = Vg +[ Uc(λee + λ) − Dl](
∂e
∂g
) − (Dl − Ucλge)=0
























Γg = Vg − [Uc(λee + λ) − Dl]
λg
λe
− (Dl − Ucλge)
























where the ￿rst term capturing the ￿gains from trade￿- eﬀect is negative, and
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